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As like as wired communication and mobile ad hoc networking, 
mobile IP communication is also vulnerable to different kinds of 
attack. Among different kinds of attack Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
is a great threat for mobile IP communication. In this paper we 
proposed to imply a lightweight packet filtering technique in 
different domains and base stations of mobile IP communication. 
If there is any packet containing spoofed IP address created by 
DoS attackers, our scheme can detect and then filters the 
suspected packets. We evaluated the performance of our proposed 
scheme using ns-2. The results indicate that our proposed scheme 
can significantly reduce the effect of DoS attacks and improves 
performance of mobile IP communication.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2. [COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS]: 




Denial-of-Service (DoS), Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS), 
Mobile Node (MN), Mobile Host (MH), Home Agent (HA), 
Foreign Agent (FA), Correspondent Node (CN), Care-of-Address 
(COA). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Today’ world is enjoying the tremendous advancement in 
the area of mobile computing. It ensures much speed and ease in 
every sphere of our life. Demands for mobile computing are also 
emerging as smaller PCs, PDAs and Mobile phones becom  more 
commonly used. Although we have worldwide Internet access, we 
cannot expect to take all benefit from Internet until we can ensure 
confidential access to Internet in anytime and from anywhere in 
the world. It is the promise of the Mobile IP that the user can 
enjoy seamless roaming and transparent application while away 
from their home. Mobile IP is a protocol to support continuous 
access to Internet. Providing secure communication service has 
now become a major concern of the related researchers. S curity 
mechanisms for attacks on  
mobile or wireless networks include packet filtering techniques, 
encryption, key management, authentication, and routing [1-5, 8, 
10, 16-18]. Securing Mobile IP is a difficult task, made of by its 
inherent characteristics such as frequently changing its point of 
attachment, no central administration and its dynamic nature. But 
security support is the most necessary thing for mobile computing 
environments. There are different kinds of attacks in Mobile IP 
Communication which can disrupt the normal communication of 
Mobile IP. Among all the attacks, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack 
has become an increasing threat to the reliability of the internet. 
A huge amount of work has been done for preventing or 
mitigating this attack. But most of these works have been done 
for wired communication. DoS attack is also a great threat for 
Mobile IP Communication. Although some works have ben 
done for enhancing the security for Mobile IP communication, 
most of the works provide a general solution. They do not 
provide the security requirements of the applications and don’t 
cope with specific attack. So we proposed a general solution for 
detecting and preventing DoS attack in Mobile IP communication 
in this paper.    
The reminder of this paper is as follows: we present the brief 
overview of mobile IP communication in section 2. Section 3 
represents different kinds of attacks including DoS attack. We 
introduce several related works in section 4. We proposed our 
desired solution to imply a lightweight packet filtering technique 
of mobile IP communication in section 5. The performance 
analysis and discussion are presented in section 6. I section 7, 
we conclude this paper with future works. 
2. MOBILE IP 
2.1 Overview 
Mobile IP is an open standard approved by the Internet 
Engineering Steering Group (IESG) in June 1996 and published 
as a proposed standard by the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) in November 1996 in order to support mobility. Mobile IP 
allows users to keep the same IP address, enjoy similar Internet 
 
 
connectivity and safety while roaming between IP networks. A 
seamless delivery of information to its destination can be 
provided by Mobile IP.  Basically Mobile IP is a modification to 
IP that allows the nodes to continue to receive datagr m when the 
user changes the computer’s point of attachment to the Internet. 
For this purpose some additional control messages are involved 
that allow the IP nodes to manage their IP routing able reliably. 
During the development of Mobile IP, scalability was considered, 
as a dominant factor so that in future a high percentage of the 
nodes attached to the Internet will have the capability of mobility. 
2.2 Architecture of Mobile IP 
Mobile IP introduces the following new functional entities that 
are given below: 
Mobile Node: A host or router that may change its point of 
attachment from one network to another without changing its IP 
address is called a mobile node. It can continue to communicate 
with other nodes at any location using its IP address. 
Home Agent: A home agent is a router on the mobile node’s 
home network that maintains current location information for the 
mobile node and forwards the packets that are addressed to the 
mobile node to its current point of attachment on the network, 
when it is away from home. 
Foreign Agent: The Foreign Agent is a router on a mobile node’s 
visited network and functions as the point of attachment for the 
Mobile Node when it is away from home, delivering packets from 
the Home Agent to the Mobile Node. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mobile IP components and their relationships. 
2.3 How Mobile IP works 
Mobile IP uses two IP addresses: a fixed home address and a 
care-of-address (COA) that changes at each new point f 
attachment. When a mobile node moves from its home network to 
a foreign network, it waits for an advertisement from or sends a 
solicitation message to the foreign agent on the for ign network 
informing its presence. The mobile node thus obtains a COA, 
which is either dynamically assigned or is associated with its 
foreign host. The home address is static and is used for 
identifying TCP connections. The home address makes it possible 
that the mobile node is continually able to receive data on its 
home network. On the other hand, COA indicates the network 
number and it changes at each new point of attachment with 
respect to the network topology [1]. 
The protocol of Mobile IP can be best described with the 
cooperation of three separable mechanisms discussed below: 
Agent Discovery: A mobile node discovers its home and foreign 
agents in the discovery phase. 
Registration: A mobile device registers its COA with s home 
agent and foreign agent in the registration phase. 
Tunneling: A tunnel is set up to route packets from the home 
agent to the foreign agent and finally to the mobile node. 
3. DoS ATTACK SCENARIOS 
A DoS attack [2, 3] is any event that diminishes a network’s 
capacity to perform its expected function. These attacks are 
launched against server resources or network bandwidth by 
preventing authorized users from accessing resources. The effect 
of these attacks varies from temporarily blocking service 
availability to permanently distorting information i  the network. 
DoS attacks can target a client computer or a server computer. 
For example, an attack may target a system by exhausting limited 
wireless resources such as bandwidth, storage space, battery 
power, CPU, or system memory. Networks and applications can 
be attacked by modifying routing information or changing system 
configuration, thereby directly attacking data integrity. 
A simple delimitation of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is ‘A bad 
guy preventing a good guy from accomplishing work done’. 
Actually, a DoS attack takes one of the two forms: 
- A bad guy floods nuisance packets (TCP SYN flooding) or  




Figure 2. TCP SYN flooding DoS attack Scenario. 
In the case of Mobile IP, when a bad guy somehow manages a 
bogus registration of a new COA for a particular mobile node or 
generates a bogus registration request specifying its own IP 
address as the COA for a mobile node, a DoS attack c n occur 
and can raise some problems: 
-The actual mobile node is no longer connected. 
-The bad guy can see all the traffic going to actual mobile node. 
-All packets sent by correspondent nodes would be tunneled by 
home agent to the bad guy. 
 
 
Figure 3. Redirecting tunnel DoS attack. 
In this attack an attacker can overflow the access server. It is 
possible because the sensitive IP addresses of the HA and the MN 
are not hidden in the registration message. Unlike a privacy 
attack, where an adversary is trying to gain access to information 
it is not allowed to see, a DoS attack involves an adversary trying 
to keep you from accessing information or resources you have 
every right to access. This attack does harm for tw systems: 
-The destination targeted system 
-The system which is actually using the spoofed address in the 
global routing system.  
DoS attacks are potentially devastating to the victim. This attack 
typically attempts to flood a target with traffic to waste network 
bandwidth or server resources. The DoS attacks that target 
resources can be grouped into three broad scenarios.  
The first attack scenario targets storage and processing resources. 
This is an attack that mainly targets the memory, storage space, or 
CPU of the service provider. Consider the case where a node 
continuously sends an executable flooding packet to its 
neighborhoods and to overload the storage space and xhaust the 
memory of that node. This prevents the node from sending or 
receiving packets from other legitimate nodes.  
The second attack scenario targets energy resources, sp cifically 
the battery power of the service provider. Since mobile devices 
operate by battery power, energy is an important resource in 
mobile IP communication. A malicious node may continuously 
send a bogus packet to a node with the intention of consuming 
the victim’s battery energy and preventing other nodes from 
communicating with the node.  
The third attack scenario targets bandwidth. Consider the case 
where an attacker located between multiple communicati g nodes 
wants to waste the network bandwidth and disrupt connectivity. 
The malicious node can continuously send packets wih bogus 
source IP addresses of other nodes, thereby overloading the 
network. This consumes the resources of all neighbors that 
communicate, overloads the network, and results in performance 
degradations.  
In this case, firewall offers some level of protection. They can be 
programmed to drop all packets from a known attacking host, but 
it’s easy for the attacker to simply put a different source IP 
address in each packet by using IP spoofing technique. So, in this 
paper, we applied some filtering techniques to filter the suspected 
packets  in order to protect against DoS attacks.  
4. RELATED WORKS 
Currently Mobile IP is gaining popularity for its attractive 
features and applications. Mobile IP raises new security issues for 
wireless network and there is comparatively higher probability 
(compared with wired network) of being attacked by hostile 
opponents. Braun et al. [4] proposed a solution to provide 
security to Mobile IP using IP Sec. Considering a VPN or a 
secured network protected by a firewall, the way in which a 
Mobile Node can securely access this network is proposed in [4]. 
In order to traverse the firewall the Mobile Node has to 
authenticate itself using IP Sec. Zao et al. [5] used IP Sec ESP 
protocol in Mobile IP to protect against both passive and active 
attacks. They also proposed to add some modifications t  agent 
advertisement and to registration request messages. Gupta et al.  
[6] proposed MobileIP protocol so that authorized users can 
access network that is protected by firewalls or some 
combinations of source filtering routers or the network, which are 
using private address space for security reasons. Secure Mobile 
IP protocol has been proposed to modify Mobile IP protocol with 
IP Sec in [7]. Datagram going into the network and going out the 
visiting network both are securely processed using IP Sec. Here 
secure Mobile IP is implemented on gateway servers and mobile 
hosts. In most the above works some general security measures 
such as cryptography, authentication etc are used to reduce the 
threats against mobile IP communication. But they didn’t focus 
on specific attack. Security attacks and mechanisms for mobile or 
wireless networks through encryption, key management, 
authentication, routing, and packet filtering techniques have been 
proposed in many research papers [1-5, 8, 10, 17-20]. Some 
researches also have been done for detecting and preventing DoS 
attack, but all of them are for wired communication or mobile ad 
hoc networking. Xiang et al. [9] proposed a defense system 
against DoS attack by large scale IP Trace back. Denko t al. [18] 
proposed a DoS attack prevention scheme in mobile ad hoc 
network’s using reputation based incentive scheme. In this 
proposed mechanism, the reputation of all nodes in the add hoc 
network will be updated based on their behavior (good or 
malicious). Xiaowei Yang, David Wetherall and Tom Anderson 
[11] proposed TVA system, Packet Passport system and StopIt 
system for limiting DoS attack in wired communication. Traffic 
Validation Architecture (TVA) is short-term authorization that 
senders obtain from receivers and stamp on their packets [11]. 
The Packet Passport system is a piece of authentication 
information embedded into an IP packet that authenticates the 
source IP address [11]. StopIt is a packet filtering system to block 
the undesired traffic it receives [11].  
5. DESIGN OF PROPOSED SOLUTION  
Detecting and preventing DoS attacks is difficult in highly 
dynamic and large networks. Hence, it is necessary to divide 
these networks into small and manageable groups and implement 
security mechanisms in each group in a distributed manner. In 
this paper, at first we divided the whole network into some 
domains. Then we divided each domain into some clusters. Each 
cluster contains one or more wired or mobile node. Clustering 
provides a distributed and scalable architecture for network 
monitoring and topology control. Clustering architecture also 
provides a localized attack detection and prevention mechanism 
through continuous monitoring and information exchange. This 
localized and distributed feature also reduces storage and 
communication overhead, thereby optimizing network bandwidth 
utilization. The figure below shows the clustering architecture: 
 
 
Figure 4. Clustering Architecture of mobile IP 
communication. 
We have created a wired-cum-wireless topology through 
which we can exchange packets between a wired and wireless 
domain via a base-station. But a mobile node may rom utside the 
domain of its base station and should still continue to receive 
packets destined to it. Actually we have extended the mobile IP 
support in a wired-cum-wireless scenario.  
In the above picture there is a wired domain consisti g of 2 
wired nodes, W0 and W1. We have 2 base-station nodes and call 
them Home Agent (HA) and Foreign Agent (FA) respectiv ly. 
The wired node W1 is connected to HA and FA as shown in the 
figure 4. There is a roaming mobile node called Mobile Host 
(MH) that moves between its home agent domain and foreign 
agent domain. A TCP flow will be set up between anynode (e.g. 
W0) and MH. As MH moves out from the domain of it’sHA, into 
the domain of FA, the packets destined for MH is redirected by 
it’s HA to the FA as per mobile IP protocol definitons.  
In the above topology we have one wired domain (denoted 
by 0) and 2 wireless domains (denoted by 1 & 2 respectively). 
Hence the addresses of two wired nodes are 0.0.0 and 0.1.0. In 
the first wireless domain (domain 1) we have a base-station, HA 
and mobile node MH, in the same single cluster. Their addresses 
are 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 respectively. For the second wireless domain 
(domain 2) we have a base-station, FA with an address of 2.0.0. 
However when the MH will move into the domain of FA, the 
packets originating from a wired domain and destined to MH will 
reach it as a result of the Mobile IP protocol. The above figure is 
a basic structure of mobile IP communication network. This 
network may contain a huge number of domains; each domain 
may contain different number of clusters and each cluster can 
contain a different number of nodes. 
We have created a wired-cum-wireless topology through 
which we can exchange packets between a wired and wireless 
domain via a base-station. But a mobile node may rom utside 
the domain of its base station and should still continue to receive 
packets destined to it. Actually we have extended the mobile IP 
support in a wired-cum-wireless scenario.  
In the above picture there is a wired domain consisti g of 2 
wired nodes, W0 and W1. We have 2 base-station nodes and call 
them Home Agent (HA) and Foreign Agent (FA) respectiv ly. 
The wired node W1 is connected to HA and FA as shown in the 
figure. There is a roaming mobile node called Mobile Host (MH) 
that moves between its home agent and foreign agents. A TCP 
flow will be set up between any node (e.g. W0) and MH. As MH 
moves out from the domain of it’s HA, into the domain of FA, the 
packets destined for MH is redirected by it’s HA to the FA as per 
mobile IP protocol definitions.  
In the above topology we have one wired domain (denoted 
by 0) and 2 wireless domains (denoted by 1 & 2 respectively). 
Hence the addresses of two wired nodes are 0.0.0 and 0.1.0. In 
the first wireless domain (domain 1) we have a base-station, HA 
and mobile node MH, in the same single cluster. Their addresses 
are 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 respectively. For the second wireless domain 
(domain 2) we have a base-station, FA with an address of 2.0.0. 
However when the MH will move into the domain of FA, the 
packets originating from a wired domain and destined to MH will 
reach it as a result of the Mobile IP protocol. The above figure is 
a basic structure of mobile IP communication network. This 
network may contain a huge number of domains; each domain 
may contain different number of clusters and each cluster can 
contain a different number of nodes. 
Filtering in Domain Periphery Router: 
In each domain there is an edge or periphery router through 
which each packet within the domain has to pass for going to 
another domain. In the above figure-4, the node W(1) is the 
periphery router for domain 0. So our proposed scheme will 
imply filtering technique in that node. If any malicious node from 
domain 0 wants to attack a mobile node outside that domain with 
spoofed IP address then the periphery router will detect and 
discard that suspected packet. The periphery router would check: 
IF          packet’s source address is within domain’s address  
THEN   forwards the packet 
 
IF          packet’s source address is anything else 
THEN   discard the packet 
 
Filtering in the Base Station Node: 
If the attacker resides inside the same domain of the 
victim, then the edge or periphery router could notde ect the 
attacking packet. That’s why we have proposed an additional 
filtering technique in the Base Station node (HA or FA) to 
which the mobile nodes are connected. Basically the base 
station nodes (HA or FA) in mobile IP communication are the 
main targets of the attackers, because the mobile nodes get 
services from these base stations. So detecting and preventing 
attacks in the base station nodes is very important. In our 
proposed scheme the base station node will filter a packet if 
one of the following events occurs:     
 If the base station’s router queue overflows 
 If there are many packets from same domain or same 
cluster, because the attacker nodes at first take help from the 
neighbor for attacking any target.   
 If most of the bandwidth of the network is consumed by 
DoS attackers, then the network will be congested. If the network 
gets congested then incoming packets should be discar ed for the 
time beings.  
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
 
Assumptions 
We make the following assumptions for the proper operation 
of the proposed architecture: 
(a) Each mobile node in the network has a unique ID and can 
join or leave the network freely. 
(b) Each packet is of equal size, although packet may vary in 
size according to their contained data.  Packet sending rates are 
also constant. 
(c) Initially, all nodes have equal computational and storage 
capability, although a node may have more resources than others 
during the communication process. 
5.1 Simulation Environment: 
We have done the performance evaluation using NS2 [12, 14, 15, 
17]. At first we have implemented the DoS attack scenario without 
protection. After that we have simulated the scenario with applying 
filtering technique in the periphery routers only, then with our full 
proposed scheme. Then we compared the performance results. 
Simulation performance metrics and simulation parameters are 
given below: 
Table 1. Simulation Parameters 
Parameters Values/Ranges 
Simulation area 1000m x 1000m 
Speed (m/s) 1 m/s to 20 m/s 
Packet Rate 5 Packets / s 
Packet Size 128 Bytes 
Traffic Source CBR 
Pause Time Uniformly distributed in 0-50 s  
Routing Protocols DSDV  and Mobile IP 
Number of Nodes 
(max) 
100 
Number of Domains 4 - 5 
Number of Clusters 5 - 10 
Transmission Range 300 m 
Simulation Time 250 s 
 
5.2 Performance Metrics 
The performances of simulation were measured using the 
following metrics: 
-Packet delivery ratio: Defined as the ratio of theotal number of 
packets received by destinations and the total number of packets 
sent by a source.  
-Routing and Communication overhead. Defined as the number 
of instructions and packets needed to maintain the entire network. 
-Misbehaving nodes detection rate. Defined as the ratio of the 
total number of malicious node detected and the total number of 
malicious node in the network     
-Network Size. Defined as the total area of the network. 
5.3 Comparison of  Simulation Results 
 
 
Figure 5. Time Vs Detection rate. 
The above figure-5 shows that our system will exhibit better 
performance for malicious node detection rate if we use base 
station filtering and the periphery router filtering rather than 
using only periphery router filtering 
 
 
Figure 6. Time Vs Detection rate. 
If number of misbehaving nodes increases then the packet 
delivery ratio will decrease due to attack in the servers and 
network resources consumed by the attackers.  The above figure-
6 shows that if our proposed scheme is applied then packet 




Figure 7. Network size Vs overhead. 
The above figure-7 shows that, as the network size increases the 
total overhead increases. When our proposed scheme is applied the 
overhead is relatively lower due to the use of clustering 
architecture. 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
DoS attack in mobile IP communication is serious, and the 
detection and prevention of this attack is difficult than in their 
wired counterparts. In this paper, we proposed packet filtering 
technique for detecting and preventing DoS attack in mobile IP 
communication. We proposed to apply a packet filtering 
technique at the vulnerable points of the mobile IP
communication to check the suspicious packet. We usd the 
network simulator ns-2 for simulating the performance of our 
proposed system. We observed that our proposed scheme showed 
better performance for the protection of system in comparison 
with system without filtering. In future we want toanalyze the 
effect of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) in mobile IP 
communication.  
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